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While the legacy o the Ottoman past continues to be felt throughout this variegated geography, the intensity and urgency o political contests over that legacy are experienced perhaps most profoundly in contemporary Turkey. Not only was the imperial center in Istanbul, but the leaders o the late Ottoman Empire, who su fered the dismemberment o their polity, were responsible for establishing the ideological and legal foundations for what would become the Turkish nation-state. The early Turkish Republic overtly disavowed its ties to the Ottoman state it had just supplanted, promulgating narratives o the nation's heroic emergence only by silencing the o ten violent events that had shaped the formation o the national state. Despite the o ficial disavowal o continuity with the Ottoman regime, it was undeniable that the leaders who founded the Turkish Republic were part o the cadre that governed the empire in its war-ravaged, final decade.
It is significant, then, that in recent years Turkey has witnessed a flourishing o debates about its historical past, in which o ficial accounts o the end o empire and the formation o the nation-state have come under rigorous scrutiny. A growing number o commentators have insisted that renewed attention to history is imperative for the future o Turkish democracy. Taner Akçam, a prominent historian o late Ottoman and Turkish republican history, recently o fered the following remarks about the public importance o history: "Any e fort towards democratization in [the Middle East] today must begin with a dialogue about history and, most important, the ensemble o events that transpired during the transition from Empire to Republic. Only such a process will complete Turkey's real transition from Empire to a normal Republic." Akçam has written numerous books that focus on the political violence that led to the formation o the Turkish nation-state, and in particular he gained notoriety for being among the first historians o Turkish origin to recognize the killing o Armenians in 1915 as a genocide. This position has not been an easy or a safe one to assume, and some ultranationalists have threatened to assassinate him.
Akçam's courageous call for historical dialogue has been echoed by the historical sociologist, Fatma Müge Göçek. Göçek explains that suppression o the historical record undermines the process o democratization: "All nationstates systematically develop their own o ficial narratives o history in an attempt to sustain their present rule through the control o the past. . . . In the case o contemporary Turkey, the nation-state has created an imperfect and faulty perception o historical reality. In so doing, it has impeded Turkey's chances o becoming a truly participatory democracy, because failure to confront the past leads to the reproduction o the patterns o collective violence, prejudice and discrimination contained therein. " What Akçam refers to as historical dialogue, Göçek more aggressively terms confrontation. For both, history is a privileged discourse o political engagement.
o the
What is at stake in history writing, in these assessments, is not just a particular political position within a broader field, but the very possibility o a "normal Republic" and o "truly participatory democracy," that is to say, the very possibility o democratic politics. I Renan could assert in the late nineteenth century that "progress in historical studies o ten constitutes a danger for [the principle o ] nationality," critical historians in Turkey today are finding it increasingly necessary to entertain the danger o this knowledge for the sake o promoting democracy.
Historical criticism, for such commentators, performs two functions at once. First, it denounces the political foreclosures that the modern state historically exacted in the name o nation-building. It challenges state-sanctioned modes o historical memory by producing a counter-historiography that transgresses the limits imposed by o ficial narratives o the nation. Second, and following from the first, historical critique enacts a politics in its own right, seeking in the very act o historical writing to deepen and extend the boundaries o public debate. Akçam and Göçek's historical critiques perform the participatory dialogue that they argue the state has prevented from emerging. Historical critics in Turkey mobilize accounts o the past in order to intervene in the present, seeking nothing less than a transformation o the conditions o modern political belonging. In the name o democracy, they aim to throw into question the key narratives that have stabilized and secured the national political subject.
Yet to the extent that historical critiques aspire to be intelligible as political interventions, the exercise o critique must in some measure operate within, or with reference to, the available terms o political address and abide by the existing conditions o political vocality. I historical critique is e ficacious as a kind o politics in the present, then it presupposes particular illocutionary conditions that define its field o e fectivity-conditions that it neither determines nor controls but inherits from the very political milieu it aims to disrupt. Indeed, history has become a powerful discourse for questioning institutional power precisely because its forms o knowledge have long been empowered by the state. Its potency, I maintain, is also the source o its complicity with the powers it would scrutinize. What, we might ask, do critical histories owe to the present they seek to destabilize? In what ways are hegemonic formations o national citizenship confirmed, troubled, or remade in acts o historical critique?
In this essay, I examine several uses o historical discourse in contemporary Turkey and investigate the field o political intervention presupposed in each case. Rather than privilege the writings o professional scholars, such as Akçam and Göçek, I emphasize the wide social and political reach o historical discourse and chart its deployment among variously positioned socioreligious movements. The analysis examines the invocation o history as a social practice, one that requires certain forms o subjectivity, contexts o performance, and techniques o enactment. To the extent that history has emerged as a central discourse for democratic critique, the political potential and limits o its uses warrant analytical scrutiny. My contention is that available modes o critical discourse, particularly those that are heralded as a necessary means for democratization, ought to be subjected to critical analysis in their own right.
Political Belonging a ter the Ottoman Empire
Centering on the demise o the Ottoman Empire and the politically troubled birth o a post-Ottoman world o nation-states, historical critics today confront key contradictions that have shaped modern political authority in the region. Rights o citizenship were brought into being amidst a tremendous amount o violence, territorial reorganization, and forced population displacement. In order to understand the stakes o historical critique in Turkey today, it is worth starting with a brie sketch o the history in question.
The transition from empire to republic, which in the long historical view extends from the mid-nineteenth century through the first decades o the twentieth, was marked by a number o concurrent and sometimes contradictory trends. The transition from empire to republic, as a protracted historical phenomenon, reveals a profoundly troubling ambivalence: on the one hand, the development o constitutional government and proclamations o equal citizenship, and on the other, the rapid escalation o racialized and ethnosectarian violence that were constitutive o assumptions about who deserved legal protection in the first place. The birth o the Turkish Republic out o the violence o Ottoman collapse exemplifies the impasse that Hannah Arendt famously announced for a democratic political tradition that espoused the rights o man but proved, in the course o the twentieth century, unable to secure such rights for those who most needed its protections: masses o displaced persons, refugees, and stateless populations who had been expelled from existing states. Building on Arendt's formulations, Giorgio Agamben suggests that the refugee is a disquieting figure in the system o nation-states because it breaks "the identity between the human and the citizen. . . . The refugee . . . unhinges the old trinity o state-nation-territory."
I the late-and post-Ottoman geography reveals the impasse proclaimed by Arendt and later echoed by Agamben, it also presents tensions o political belonging that are far more disturbing than the notion o an unhinging o state-nation-territory suggests. It is worth recalling that the nation-states that succeeded the Ottoman Empire emerged in precisely those decades that Arendt claimed to be witnessing the "decline o the nation-state." In such contexts, the presence o refugees and other politically divested populations not only augured a crisis for a political tradition that identified democracy with national sovereignty, but was part o the presupposed ground on which that sovereignty was founded and given definition. By the time o the birth o the Turkish Republic, it became di ficult to disentangle two seemingly contradictory tendencies at the heart o modern statecra t: at once the promotion o liberty and equality for all citizens, and the formation o a state that reserved the authority to decide with violent means who counted as deserving o such protections and who needed to be expelled from political belonging as such.
Historical critics who seek to promote democracy in Turkey today are centering their concerns on the turbulent era in which the empire was dismantled and gave way to the production o the republican nation-state. Critics are re-examining history in order to interrogate the legacies that the empire bequeathed to a republic that claimed radical rupture from it, and in the process they attempt to ascertain the limits imposed by established modes o political belonging.
To the extent that such critics seek in their discourses to enact a politics o democratization, we should ask o such discourses, what kind o political subject is embodied in acts o historical critique? To what extent does that subject undermine or reproduce the terms o political belonging violently imposed in the emergence o the nation-state?
Ethnographic Locations
In order to attend to these questions, I want to locate the use o history in contexts where its pragmatic purchase-as both presupposing and embodying a certain formation o the subject-is rendered visible. I propose two methodological points o departure. First, the locus o historical criticism is neither exclusively nor necessarily within sites o professional historical scholarship. I take a deliberately broad understanding o "critical history," one which encompasses the e forts o a wide range o social groups and movements that seek, in the act o historical narration, to contest statist norms o national belonging. Such political interventions o ten rely upon but do not always remain loyal to the criteria o knowledge-production disciplined by the academic profession. What is analytically required is what we might term an ethnographic perspective that identifies a landscape o positions from which projects o historical critique are launched. These various positions are sometimes convergent but also potentially competing.
Second, an ethnographic perspective is not primarily concerned with the validity o the historical claims made by the actors in question. The point is not epistemological-that, for instance, final historical truth is illusory or simply outside o the limits o possible human knowledge. Rather, the aim is to interrogate the kind o political subject presupposed by practices o historical critique or refashioned in its enactments. The content o historical argument is not unimportant, but for our purposes it is subordinate o the to the pragmatic work performed in the enactment o the discourse. The significance o historical argument is defined by the practice that enables its enunciation.
The emergence o a new wave o historiographies o the birth o the republican state over the past two decades has been bolstered by a concomitant proliferation o locations o historical discourse. Here, I juxtapose two di ferent e forts currently underway to mobilize history as a mechanism for gaining political purchase on the present. In both cases, I suggest, the appeal to history serves at once to create the grounds for political criticism and establishes limits to that critique. The Islamist project o historical narration was most boldly asserted in public commemorations o events that republican historiography meticulously elided, including political victories o the Ottoman state. During the era o the early republic, political leaders were careful to distance their own present from the Ottoman past. For much o the republican period national holidays involved celebrating events that transpired a ter the collapse o the empire, largely focusing on key moments in the struggle to establish a national Turkish state. In the 1990s, Islamist groups in Istanbul pushed back against the narrative elision o the Ottoman past, orchestrating public commemorations o the fi teenth-century Ottoman conquest o Constantinople.
Islamist History
The project o renarrating the nation's history has remained responsive to political transformations in the present. Commemorations o the Ottoman past were sparked by the electoral success o the Welfare Party-a political party that was commonly glossed as Islamist. In the late 1990s, however, the Welfare Party was forced to step down when the state's National Security Council deemed that it had violated the fundamental principle o secularism. Islamist activists shi ted tactics in a context in which their room for maneuver was increasingly restricted, but without relinquishing the struggle to challenge o ficial accounts o national history. Instead o overtly laying claim to a historical moment that the republican state had largely occluded (that o Ottoman conquest), some Islamist actors began to appropriate and redefine the history o the early republic that the state had volubly recounted and whose interpretation it had tenaciously controlled. The aim o this appropriation was to resignify early republican leaders and policies as Islamist, and thereby to undermine the claim that secularist politics in the present day adequately represented the founding principles o the republic. They sought to turn the secularist narrative o the republic's foundation on its head.
For instance, in 1998 on the occasion o the seventy-fi th anniversary o the republic, an Islamist daily, Akit, published a photograph o Atatürk standing next to a religious leader and engaged in a collective act o prayer. This revisionist critique o o ficial history has not proceeded primarily through the discourse o professional historians. It has sparked the participation o political o ficials, grassroots activists, and ordinary citizens alike; it has operated through a range o practical activities, such as parades, public concerts, conferences, symposia, and newspaper editorials-a di fuse terrain o action that produces what we might describe as public, rather than strictly professional, history.
Even within the more restricted domain o academic history, a new generation o pious scholars has begun to reevaluate the historical record in ways that contribute to the broader political project o remaking public sensibilities toward the past. Some such historians are appealing to the late Ottoman archive in order to demonstrate that Islamist intellectuals o the time supported nationalist and modernist reforms, finding Islamic forms o reasoning to support the emergence o the republican state. Such historical reappraisals, as Brian Silverstein demonstrates, reveal "the structural and emotional ability o contemporary Turkish Muslims to reconnect with these earlier subjectivities."
These sorts o Islamist narratives o history do not question the propriety o the nation-state as the form that the political body should adopt or the long-standing project o modernization pursued by that state. Rather, o the Islamist historiography negotiates the terms on which both nation and modernization might be conceived, creating new conditions for identifying with those projects on Islamic, rather than secularist, grounds. Historical critique, in this location, projects an alternative vision o legitimate national governance from that o fered by Turkish secularists. It attempts to fashion a new political subject within the given frame o the national political body.
Alevi History
and provincial towns alike. In the process Alevis began to adopt characteristically modern forms o social and political organization, including the formation o a short-lived political party and numerous civil society organizations that coordinate a ra t o activities including ritual performances, a ter-school youth groups, and political protests.
Over the course o the twentieth century, the Alevi encounter with political modernity has been deeply ambivalent. On the one hand, many Alevis today praise the formation o the Turkish Republic, claiming that it enshrined rights o secular citizenship that protected Alevis from legalized persecution by the Sunni majority. It is common to hear Alevi leaders and intellectuals claim that the community is a "foundational element" (asli unsur) or a "cornerstone" (temel taşı) o the secular republic. On the other hand, the history o the republic has not been peaceful for many Alevi communities. It has been strikingly violent, perpetuating rather than preventing the political vulnerability o Alevis. I secular national citizenship is commonly touted by Alevis today as a necessary prerequisite for political liberty and equality, the actual history o secular-national modernity has instigated considerable hostility and violence against Alevis.
In the past several decades, Alevi intellectuals and civil society organizations have made use o the discourse o history as a way o publicly representing their religious identity. The mobilization o history reveals the ambivalent modernity experienced by many Alevis. Publicly narrating the historical religious identity o their community is one method adopted by Alevi intellectuals to contest derogatory stereotypes and demand political protections that would ensure the legitimacy and viability o communal practices. The social and political resources provided by historical discourse have allowed Alevis to loosen the narratives o the nation that have long conflated Turkish nationality with Sunni Muslim identity. However, the genre o history-its narrative forms, discursive tropes, and institutional anchors-has been organized and disciplined by the nation-state itself. Hence, Alevis are creating spaces for participation within national publics that have long been premised on their exclusion, but in the process are positioning themselves within frames o reference monitored and regulated by the state.
There are a number o di ferent sites where Alevis are appealing to the discourse o history as a mode o defining and representing their communal identity. Most evident is the rapid proliferation o texts in which Alevi religiosity is narrated as a social historical phenomenon. The texts are composed by Alevi intellectuals, who are o ten highly educated, sometimes possessing degrees from Turkish universities, but are very rarely professional historians with academic appointments. The texts are generally oriented by narrative conventions that emplot Alevi religiosity across a set o epochs and dynastic states, which follow the migratory movement o Alevis from Central Asia into Anatolia, alongside the rise and fall o several Turkic states, up through the Ottoman Empire and into the national republic. The trajectory o the narrative does not counter the institutionalized historiography o the nation; in its historical reference points and state-centered periodization, it replicates the narrative form o o ficial Turkish history.
In addition to the production o a new corpus o texts, the mobilization o historical discourses among Alevis has contributed to the formation o contexts o public ritual performance. In ritual contexts, the genre o social history is a fixed to certain images, icons, forms o speaking and rhetorical address, and modes o spectatorship. History, in such contexts, helps to establish the conditions o a legitimate Alevi presence in public space.
Public Alevi gatherings o ten reveal a polyphonic mode o address: on the one hand, they serve to recreate for Alevis residing in towns and cities rituals that were once performed in rural villages; on the other hand, they address a heterogeneous audience, including not only Alevis, but also state o ficials, representatives o political parties, journalists, academics, and officials from the European Union. Alevis who organize these events carry the burden o performing their religiosity for those who claim outsider status, watching from a distance.
At one event that I attended, a professor o religious history was invited to deliver a lecture about Alevism. The lecture was given just prior to an enactment o an Alevi ritual. Both lecture and ritual were elements o a single event, each performed on an elevated stage facing an audience. The professor did not present himsel as a participant in a devotional ritual but as an academic it had become integrated into the staged performance itself.
More common at such events than formal academic lectures is the use o pictorial icons, specifically, images o Ali ibn Abi Talib (the Prophet Muhammad's cousin), a medieval saint named Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli, and the leader o the early Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. This conjunction o images cuts across a variety o historical moments, creating a narrative series only through discontinuous jumps: while Ali is a seventh-century figure from early Islamic history, Hacı Bektaş is best known as a mystic from medieval Anatolia, and Atatürk is generally seen as the founder o the modern, secular Turkish republic.
The image o Ali is the least surprising in this setting. Ali is a figure honored by most Muslims, but is given special reverence by the Shi῾a and, within Turkey, by Alevis. The portrait o Ali, in this sense, is an emblem o Alevi identity. What is more surprising than the presence o Ali is the conjunction o his portrait with that o Atatürk. As mentioned above, the image o Atatürk is intensely politicized in Turkey, appearing in government buildings and public squares throughout the country. Portraits o Atatürk in Alevi settings are never those in which he is captured in a religious posture, as in Islamist portrayals, but are the standard, o ficial depictions. The medieval saint, Hacı Bektaş, is also not an incidental figure here, nor an archaic one. In addition to being the eponymous saint o the Bektaşi Sufi order, which has strongly influenced Alevi religiosity, Hacı Bektaş has been championed across the twentieth century by ideologues o the Turkish nation-state as a crucial contributor to Turkey's national spirit.
In this iconography, an emblem o Alevism in the figure o Ali is sutured both to a potent diacritic o national history (Hacı Bektaş) and to the least ambiguous icon o the modernist nation-state, Atatürk. Communal particularity is made publicly legible in conjunction with an index o the nation and anchored in the last instance by the single most authoritative sign o the state.
Unlike Islamists, Alevis have not excavated alternative political subject positions from the Ottoman archive that might challenge those entrenched by the republican state. In part, the problem is that the archive does not provide adequate representations o Alevi identity. The archival presence o Alevis is subaltern: they are referenced only rarely and almost exclusively in denigrating terms. One would have to read radically against the grain o the Ottoman archive in order to identify and isolate something akin to a coherent Alevi subjectivity. In the final years o the Ottoman Empire, certain nationalist intellectuals and ideologues began to write anew about Alevis, this time championing them as tokens o national folklore and culture. To the extent that a viable image o Alevi identity is available in select writings from the late imperial period, it confirms rather than rivals the statesanctioned national political subject.
I Islamist critique has sought to redefine the national subject, Alevi uses o history have sought to create an inhabitable location for the community within the existing narratives o political belonging. Hence the ambivalence o their political purchase: even as Alevi discourses are challenging the rigid majoritarianism o nationalism, they are marked by a return to the icons and tropes o o ficial history. The Alevi strateg is understandable, given the violent excision o entire populations deemed in the twentieth century to be foreign to the nation (particularly Armenian and Greek Christians), as well as the persistent discrimination and episodic violence to which Alevis themselves have been subject in the past several decades. History has provided a mechanism for leveraging a collective political voice, even as it has required that Alevis abide by narrative norms authorized by the state.
The Limits o Political Voice
In these examples, the significance o history does not lie in the set o methods and procedures it o fers for investigating the past-methods and procedures that are ostensibly neutral with respect to context, available for employment in any location and with respect to any social object. Rather, the key questions to which I have drawn attention are, what kind o work can history be put to performing and what ends can it be mobilized to attain? The invocation o history, as a practical exercise, is defined by contextual determinants; its conditions o e fectivity are not singular or uniform.
Additionally, the tone and tenor o historical discourse is variable. Among Islamists, historical enterprises are bold, challenging, and transgressive. Alevis, by contrast, o ten deploy historical discourses in ways that are more hedged, asserting collective identity but tending to conform to nationalist expectations. The tone o Alevi history is evocative o the political vulnerability experienced by the community.
I have used broad strokes for characterizing Islamist and Alevi histories in order to highlight di ferences between them. In both cases, there are exceptions to these general trends, and in some instances the exceptions push against the limits o historical practice available within each community. Here, I want to elaborate one such exceptional instance among Alevis that aims to produce a critical history, but does so for the sake o scrutinizing the social conventions and political pragmatics that undergird the practice o history. It queries the conditions o e fectivity that determine the point and purchase o Alevi history.
In Much could be made about the politics o this historical apolog . A taboo subject had been o ficially broached, a historical silence finally broken. Along the way, Erdoğan managed to score tactical political points by exploiting tensions within a rival party. What interests me, however, is not the politics o the apolog itself, but the di ficulties faced by many Alevis in responding to the apolog . Many Alevis have staunchly opposed the AKP, viewing it as an expression o political Islam rooted in Sunni revivalism, and have long been supporters o the CHP. Here, the AKP had seized the moral high ground, apologizing for violence against an Alevi community, and the CHP appeared completely fractured in its willingness to even acknowledge the scale o repression. The chain o events led certain Alevi groups and intellectuals to explicitly question the support that the community has o fered to the party. Even more powerfully, some Alevis began to question their support o the founding narratives o Turkey's political modernity, especially with regard to the process o nationalization. I nation-building was premised on the violent repression o certain Alevi communities, then would it still be valid to maintain that Alevis were foundational elements o the Turkish nation?
One Alevi intellectual from Tunceli, Cafer Solgun, raised the question directly. Solgun, who published a book on the events o Dersim, was interviewed a ter Erdoğan's apolog . A ter discussing the events that took place in Dersim in the 1930s and then o fering his opinion on the politics o the apolog , Solgun turned his critical gaze inward, toward the Alevi community's relationship to Atatürk and the Kemalist project o nation-building: "In order to avoid death, in order to stay alive, in order to protect their children, our elders thought that there was only one available path, and they named their children, that is they named us, Kemal and İsmet." The names in question refer to leaders o the early republican state, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and İsmet İnönü. Solgun continued that now that the events o Dersim were coming to light and entering into explicit public discussion, it will no longer be possible for Alevis, or anyone else, to hold on to the myth that Atatürk was unaware o the events transpiring in Dersim; evidence suggests that he ratified the operations. Prodded to respond to the fact that Atatürk's picture is o ten hung next to that o Ali in Alevi ritual halls, Solgun answered decisively, "Atatürk's portrait will definitely be removed."
Solgun's historical critique was not only directed outward, at institutional bodies that constrained, repressed, or otherwise maligned Alevis in the past. o the This nascent project will not be easy to develop. The risks it assumes are o a particular sort, which are di ferent in kind from the risks confronted by the Islamists discussed earlier. Aygün and Solgun are both attempting a historical critique o state practice, and in particular o the conditions o political belonging the state has enforced, and in this general sense are developing a critique whose aims are similar to those pursued by Islamist critics in the past several decades. Alevi critics, however, are not excavating alternative subject positions from the historical record and thereby leveraging a political ground that distinguishes itsel from that which the state has authorized, as is arguably the case with Islamist groups. The emerging line o Alevi criticism is questioning the conditions o political belonging in the nation-state, but without the assurance o a consolidated counter-political identity that credibly rivals institutionally stipulated forms o political subjectivity.
The critique o the state, represented by Aygün and Solgun, has required an internal critique, one that proceeds not by defining the outlines o a new political subject but by unmaking the terms o political legitimacy that have facilitated an Alevi presence in public life. To challenge statist authority in Alevi contexts involves questioning the narrative and iconographic practices o representation that have secured a political voice for an otherwise marginalized community. It requires that the critic speak against the conditions o political belonging that have tentatively legitimized public displays o communal identity. As a mode o political action, this form o critique is paradoxical and potentially self-undermining. What, a ter all, is the status o a political act that puts at risk its own political voice?
The Politics o Critique
In the political geography cobbled together in the a termath o Ottoman collapse, national citizenship held out the democratic promise o equality and liberty, but only by vigorously repudiating the ethno-religious pluralities that had been required o imperial political belonging. Critics today are increasingly arguing that the task o promoting democracy requires a confrontation with that history. However, apart from this broad claim, about which there is growing consensus, the underlying conception o democracy and the political subject presupposed by it are by no means self-evident. Can, for instance, democracy today be envisioned within the framework o national citizenship without reproducing the violent excisions that historically defined the birth o national sovereignty? What kind o political engagement might query the limits o national citizenship as the reigning mode o political subjectivity? I it is accepted that the historical critique o the modern state is a political enterprise in the present day, then what forms o historical practice might call into question the conditions o political vocality that the state has secured, enforced, and empowered over the past century?
In both Islamist and Alevi cases, the use o history exemplifies the general aims stated by historical critics like Akçam and Göçek, whom I mentioned at the outset. They seek to expand, augment, or otherwise enhance the conditions o participatory democracy. Yet while Islamists have been overtly transgressive o o ficial, secularist narratives o the nation-state's foundation, Alevis have tended to be far more conservative in their use o history, o ten conforming to statist narratives o political identity in order to find a stable and recognizable location within them. Despite the apparently conformist pressures placed upon the enactment o Alevi history, or perhaps because o such pressures, it is in this setting that a line o critique has begun to query the parameters o public history and the terms o political engagement they presuppose.
The notion that critique should question the conditions o public discourse is by no means unique to this context. Various traditions o historically minded political analysis, stretching back at least to the nineteenth century, have defined the critic's primary task in terms o a reflexive inquiry into the categories by which sociopolitical life is framed and formed. What is striking about the case o Alevi critics is the proximity o their own voice to the mechanisms o power they seek to undermine. Their discourse challenges the distribution o political voice that has granted them a location from which to speak. It operates at the threshold o the regnant field o politics, operating within it only so as to question the validity o its ordering.
In a late lecture, Michel Foucault forwarded a comparable notion o critique in which a subject, already formed by the operations o power, comes to question that formation: "I governmentalization is . . . this movement through which individuals are subjugated in the reality o a social practice through mechanisms o power that adhere to a truth, well, then! I will say that critique is the movement by which the subject gives himsel the right to question truth on its e fects o power and question power on its discourses o truth. . . . Critique would essentially insure the desubjugation o the subject in the context o what we could call, in a word, the politics o truth." Foucault's formulation highlights a constitutive connection between governmental power and social practice that is a key target o Aygün and Solgun's critical enterprises. They centered their attention on a set o practices, particularly the display o Atatürk's portrait, that articulates a relationship between power and truth and which establishes conditions o political subjectivity on the basis o that articulation.
Equally relevant to the Turkish context is a tension palpable in Foucault's conception, a tension he does not resolve. The mechanisms o power that the critic seeks to interrogate are themselves formative o the critic-as-subject. Foucault baldly asserts that the critic gives himsel the right to question truth and power, but from what authority does this right derive? What empowers the subject to raise such questions except the field o power being put into o the question? As Judith Butler notes in a commentary on Foucault, "To gain a critical distance from established authority means . . . to risk one's very formation as a subject. " Critique as a desubjugation o the subject, in Foucault's phrase, troubles the very parameters o action and speech that would render the e fectivity o its own enactment intelligible. The critic disrupts-as a political act-the formation o his or her own political subjectivity.
When posed in abstraction from any given location, this form o critique may appear contradictory and untenable as a ground o political engagement. Yet the tension operative in this line o analysis acquires an urgent salience when the critical move is situated within contexts where political subjectivity was given definition by means o tremendous violence, as in many o the national states that succeeded the Ottoman Empire. A critique o this articulation o violence and political belonging demands a form o inquiry that calls attention to the costs o becoming recognizable as belonging to the nation and to the limits o what is sayable within the existing field o politics. This mode o critical encounter invites reflection on how political voice is asymmetrically distributed to populations within the national body.
The questions raised by Alevi critics at the limits o the political field are unsettling to many: in the weeks following the interview in which Solgun claimed that Atatürk's picture would be removed, he received a number o death threats. These sorts o threats are most likely attributable to extremist nationalists who are ever-ready to attack those willing to critically interrogate Atatürk's legacy. Such threats are by no means idle and must be taken seriously as a matter o Solgun's personal security. Recognizing the gravity o the situation, we should nevertheless resist the temptation to circumscribe the purchase o Alevi critique solely in relation to militant nationalism, as that would leave uninterrogated the forms o institutionalized violence and power that have delimited the boundary o "normal" national politics and citizenship.
Some Alevi intellectuals and leaders who have supported Solgun have so tened, i not blunted, the purchase o his critique by focusing on the idea that photographs o Atatürk do not belong in places o worship because Atatürk was a political rather than religious leader. Basing itsel on the characteristically secular-modern categorical separation o the political from the religious, this line o support legitimizes Solgun's call for removing Atatürk's portrait, but it does so, in e fect, by abandoning the stronger political critique o Atatürk's actions in the historical repression o Alevi communities. It elides Solgun's argument that Atatürk's role in the massive killing and exiling o Alevis ought to be interrogated in its own right, and that above all, Alevis themselves ought to interrogate how their own public presence has been sustained only by expressing loyalty and commitment to a regime that exacted extraordinary political violence against them. The new line o Alevi critique is troubling to many in Turkey because it queries the forms o violence that have sustained the field o politics in which Alevis are today being o fered a location.
Alevi critics who are interrogating the costs o abiding by the given conditions o subjectivity are le t in a vulnerable position, compounded by the fact that their community already inhabits a marginalized political location within Turkey. Their line o critical inquiry stands in reference to a field o politics they refuse to accept, but they do not possess the authority to reconfigure that field in ways that would stabilize their position.
E forts to query what Foucault called the politics o truth are particularly crucial in post-Ottoman geographies, where national sovereignty and the rights o citizenship it protected were premised on mass political dispossession. Historical critique in this modality interrogates the institutional mechanisms that, in determining who counts as a citizen, have also allocated, defined, and disciplined political vocality. Democracy, in these contexts, does not only require e fective historical critique, but critique that questions the conditions o its e fectivity. This modality o historical critique probes the limits o its own political empowerment, not only as a function o constraints that restrict its entry and its participation in public life, but as a function o the discursive and iconographic incitements that provoke and produce it. The paradox o a historical critique that challenges the legitimacy o its political location is perhaps also its strength. It models a form o democratic practice that queries the exclusions o citizenship by contesting the grounds o its own inclusion. 
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